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XSEDE	  Level	  1	  Service	  Provider	  	  
Security	  Standards	  
Introduction	  Through	   acceptance	   of	   the	   XSEDE	   Level	   1	   SP	   Security	   Agreement,	   service	   providers	  (SPs)	   agree	   to	   follow	   this	   security	   baseline	   document	   approved	   by	   the	   XSEDE	   Security	  Working	  Group	  (XSWoG).	  Because	  of	  the	  natural	  trust	  relationships	  between	  major	  XSEDE	  resources	  and	  the	   interdependence	  of	   them,	  security	  vulnerabilities	  affect	   far	  more	  than	  a	  single	  SP.	  Therefore,	  this	  document	  sets	  forth	  some	  minimum	  standards	  for	  SPs	  to	  follow	  to	  protect	  themselves	  and	  each	  other,	   for	  those	  resources	  whose	  compromise	  could	  have	  direct	  
impact	   upon	   XSEDE.	   The	   list	   of	   security	   items	   comes	   both	   from	   inherited	   practices	   of	  TeraGrid	  and	  new	  findings	  in	  the	  XSEDE	  risk	  assessment.	  
Security	  Baseline	  Standards	  Items	  in	  this	  section	  are	  standards	  to	  establish	  a	  minimum	  baseline,	  i.e.,	  part	  of	  the	  ex-­‐pectations	  for	  each	  SP.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  document,	  we	  have	  additional	  guidelines	  that	  are	  recommendations	  for	  SPs	  to	  apply	  as	  best	  makes	  sense	  for	  their	  environments.	  
Vulnerability	  Management	  Most	  security	  incidents	  target	  existing	  vulnerabilities	  that	  have	  long	  since	  had	  remedies	  available.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  activities	  to	  reduce	  exposure	  and	  prevent	  incidents	  is	  to	  maintain	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  and	  properly	  patched	  software.	  This	  is	  true	  both	  for	  users	  at	  home,	  and	  those	  running	  entire	  data	  centers.	  Therefore,	  XSEDE	  Level	  1	  SPs	  are	  expected	  to:	  
• To	  maintain	  software	  patches	  such	   that	   they	  are	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  against	  exploitable	  vulnerabilities	   (for	  which	   there	   is	   a	   remedy)	   considered	   a	   significant	  threat	  to	  XSEDE.	  This	   is	   for	  all	  XSEDE	  resources	  as	  well	  as	   those	  with	  special	   trust	  rela-­‐tionships	   and	   dependencies	   with	   XSEDE	   resources	   (e.g.,	   not	   just	   an	   HPC	   for	  XSEDE	  resources,	  but	  also	  the	  authentication	  server	  that	  it	  depends	  upon).	  
• Be	   able	   to	   identify	   systems	   vulnerable	   to	   a	   particular	   exploit,	   and	   report	   back	  plans	  for	  risk	  mitigation.	  
• Perform	   regular	   (at	   least	   weekly)	   scanning	   for	   unmitigated	   vulnerabilities.	  XSEDE	  will	  provide	  use	  of	  the	  Qualys	  scanner	  for	  those	  wishing	  to	  use	  it.	  
• Test	   that	   vulnerabilities	   are	   not	   reintroduced	   after	   configuration	   changes.	   For	  this	   a	   configuration	   management	   tool,	   such	   as,	   Puppet	   or	   cfEngine	   is	   recom-­‐mended.	  
Authentication	  &	  Authorization	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It	  is	  critical	  to	  control	  access	  to	  XSEDE	  resources,	  especially	  in	  cases	  of	  privileged	  access.	  It	  is	  equally	  important	  to	  accurately	  record	  who	  has	  access	  to	  systems	  and	  that	  they	  are	  not	  exceeding	  their	  authority.	  Therefore,	  XSEDE	  Level	  1	  SPs	  are	  expected	  to:	  
• Use	  strong,	   i.e.,	  at	   least	  two-­‐factor,	  authentication	  for	  administrative	  interfaces,	  accounts	  or	  privilege	  escalation	  where	  at	  all	  possible.	  This	  could	  be	  directly	  on	  a	  system	  or	  through	  use	  of	  a	  choke	  point	  such	  as	  a	  bastion	  host	  or	  VPN.	  
• Eliminate	  the	  use	  of	  local	  passwords	  where	  possible.	  
• Disable	  plaintext	  authentication	  over	  the	  network.	  
• Record	  audit	  logs	  of	  all	  authentication	  attempts,	  including	  privilege	  escalations.	  
• Maintain	  and	  audit	  the	  list	  of	  admins	  and	  privileged	  users	  to	  avoid	  authorization	  creep	  and	  to	  remove	  access	  when	  employees	  leave	  or	  roles	  change.	  
• Notify	  the	  XSWoG	  of	  any	  SP	  security	  staff	  changes	  that	  would	  require	  revoking,	  granting	  or	  modifying	  access	   to	  XSWoG	  resources	  (secure	   jabber/wiki,	  mailing	  lists,	  hotline,	  etc.1)	  
Audit	  Logging	  It	  is	  critical	  to	  maintain	  the	  integrity	  of	  system	  and	  network	  logs	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  security	   incidents.	   As	   such,	   the	   XSEDE	   Level	   1	   SP	   Security	   Agreement	   states	   that	   SPs	   will	  maintain	   the	   logs	   necessary	   for	   incident	   investigation	   for	   at	   least	   90	   days.	   In	   the	   section	  above,	  it	  is	  also	  noted	  that	  records	  of	  attempted	  access	  are	  a	  part	  of	  these	  logs	  that	  must	  be	  recorded.	  Because	   it	   is	   trivial	   for	  an	  adversary	  who	  has	  compromised	  a	  server	  and	  gained	  root	  to	  erase	  his	  tracks	  in	  the	  logs,	  SPs	  are	  expected	  to	  copy	  these	  audited	  events	  to	  an	  ex-­‐ternal	   log	  server	   for	  safe-­‐keeping—for	  example,	  using	  syslog-­‐ng	  to	  connect	  to	  a	  hardened,	  remote	  log	  host.	  
Network	  Monitoring	  System	  and	  authentication	  logs	  are	  very	  important	  but	  often	  not	  sufficient	  to	  investigate	  all	   security	   incidents.	   Equally	   important	   are	  networks	   logs.	  While	   SPs	   are	  not	   necessarily	  expected	  to	  run	  a	  full	  Intrusion	  Detection/Prevention	  System,	  which	  can	  be	  very	  costly,	  they	  do	  need	  to	  maintain	  NetFlow	  level	  logs	  and	  statistics	  at	  their	  borders,	  particularly	  those	  for	  XSEDENet.	  A	  level	  1	  SP	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  able	  to	  answer	  if	  they	  have	  seen	  activity	  from	  spe-­‐cific	  IP	  addresses	  within	  a	  particular	  range	  of	  time.	  
Auditing	  As	  configuration	  changes	  can	  accumulate	  over	  time,	  systems	  and	  services	  can	  drift	  from	  baselines.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  SPs	  audit	  themselves	  for	  compliance	  with	  this	  base-­‐line	  at	  least	  annually	  and	  to	  report	  on	  the	  results.	  
Physical	  Access	  XSEDE	  systems	  and	  services	  are	  not	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  public	  or	  unrestricted	  areas.	  They	  must	  be	  secured	  in	  a	  facility	  that	  has	  a	  way	  to	  audit	  who	  has	  access	  to	  rooms	  with	  these	  sys-­‐tems	  and	  preferably	  audit	  logs	  to	  confirm	  who	  has	  had	  access	  at	  a	  given	  time.	  If	  the	  latter	  is	  not	  possible,	  they	  need	  to	  physically	  restrict	  access	  to	  racks	  with	  XSEDE	  servers	  to	  a	  mini-­‐mal	  list	  of	  employees.	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Additional	  Guidelines	  The	  above	  list	  of	  items	  is	  not	  exhaustive	  of	  all	  that	  one	  must	  do	  to	  be	  following	  security	  best	  practices	  within	  this	   industry,	  but	   instead	   it	   is	  a	  minimum	  list	  of	   items	   for	  a	  baseline	  that	  sites	  could	  agree	  upon.	  There	  are	  many	  other	  useful	  security	  controls,	  some	  of	  which	  we	  present	  below.	  
Host	  Security	  The	  following	  recommendations	  are	  made	  to	  protect	  XSEDE	  systems	  and	  services	  at	  the	  host	  level.	  
• Disable	  or	   remove	  unneeded	   services	  and	  accounts.	  Often	  these	  will	  be	  in-­‐stalled	  by	  default	  by	  operating	  systems	  or	  software.	  
• Eliminate	  unnecessary	  setuid/setgid	  bits	  on	  executables.	  If	  unneeded,	  these	  should	  be	  removed	  as	  they	  can	  be	  used	  for	  privilege	  escalation	  attacks.	  
• Filter	   source	   IPs	   connecting	   to	   critical	   or	   administrative	   services.	  TCPWrappers,	  host-­‐based	  firewalls	  and	  router	  ACLs	  are	  all	  useful	  to	  restrict	  ac-­‐cess	  to	  certain	  interfaces	  or	  IP	  addresses.	  This	  is	  most	  practical	  and	  most	  useful	  for	   administrative	   interfaces	   with	   a	   small	   set	   of	   users,	   but	   can	   sometimes	   be	  used	  effectively	  more	  broadly.	  Often	  one	  can	  create	  a	  single	  choke	  point	  to	  sev-­‐eral	  administrative	  services	  through	  a	  hardened	  bastion	  host	  or	  VPN	  
• Use	  minimal	  permissions	   for	  exporting	  NFS	  shares.	  NFS	  shares	  should	  only	  be	  exported	  locally	  and	  not	  across	  trust	  boundaries.	  Furthermore,	  minimal	  per-­‐missions	  should	  be	  used	  for	  a	  given	  scenario.	  There	  are	  several	  built-­‐in	  restric-­‐tions	   available,	   such	   as,	   nosuid,	   root_squash,	   noexec,	   nodev	   and	   read-­‐only	   ex-­‐ports.	  
• Use	  a	  host-­based	  IDS	  for	  integrity	  checking	  and	  log	  monitoring.	  Host-­‐based	  IDSs,	  such	  as	  OSSEC,	  provide	  many	  capabilities.	  Two	  very	  important	  ones	  are	  file	  
integrity	  checking,	   to	   detect	  modified	   configurations	  or	   binaries,	   and	   log	  moni-­
toring,	  which	  can	  watch	  for	  security	  events	  and	  correlate	  across	  log	  sources.	  
• Use	  TLS/SSL	  or	  other	  network	  encryption	  technologies	  where	  possible,	  es-­
pecially	   if	   crossing	   system	  boundaries.	  Most	  authenticated	  services	  support	  versions	   that	  use	  SSL	  or	  a	   similar	   technology	   to	  provide	  authenticity,	   integrity	  and	  confidentiality.	  In	  other	  cases,	  it	  is	  often	  possible	  to	  add-­‐on	  encryption	  with	  tools	  like	  Stunnel	  or	  SSH.	  
• Monitor	   command	   line	   history	   with	   process	   accounting	   or	   an	   instru-­
mented	   SSHD.	   It	   is	   all	   too	   easy	   for	   an	   adversary	   to	   clean	   out	   shell	   history	   or	  stop	  recording	  it,	  but	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  useful	  sources	  of	  forensic	  informa-­‐tion.	  Process	  accounting	  or	  specially	  instrumented	  SSH	  daemons	  can	  overcome	  this	  problem	  and	  record	  that	   information,	  even	  though	  it	  would	  be	  unavailable	  to	  the	  network	  IDS	  due	  to	  encryption.	  
• Use	  a	  centralized	   logging	   infrastructure.	  As	  already	  noted,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  log	  to	  a	  remote	  host	  to	  protect	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  logs.	  More	  than	  that,	  it	  is	  use-­‐ful	  to	  send	  as	  many	  of	  the	  logs	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  same	  place	  for	  alert	  correlation	  and	   greater	   visibility.	   These	   log	   servers	   should	   also	  be	  backed	  up,	   incase	   they	  too	  are	  the	  target	  of	  an	  attack.	  
Network	  Security	  The	  following	  are	  recommended	  to	  protect	  XSEDE	  resources	  at	  the	  network	  level.	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• Use	  egress/ingress	  filters	  to	  protect	  against	  spoofing.	  Because	  of	  the	  trusted	  relationship	  between	  sites,	  it	  is	  especially	  important	  not	  to	  let	  your	  network	  be	  used	  to	  spoof	  traffic.	  
• Disable	   source	   routing	   at	   trust	   boundaries.	  This	   technology	   can	  be	  abused	  for	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attacks.	  
• Utilize	   firewalls	  and	  ACLs	  as	  appropriate.	  These	  are	  often	  more	  robust	  than	  host-­‐based	  firewalls	  and	  can	  be	  used	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  controls	  for	  lay-­‐ered	  security.	  
• Deploy	  a	  network	  IDS	  to	  monitor	   for	  attacks	  against	  and	  emanating	   from	  
your	  networks.	  IDSs	  are	  by	  no	  means	  a	  panacea,	  but	  they	  can	  be	  an	  important	  piece	  of	  the	  overall	  site	  security	  architecture.	  
